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Nonreciprocity Compensation Combined With
Turbo Codes for Secret Key Generation in
Vehicular Ad Hoc Social IoT Networks
Gregory Epiphaniou, Member, IEEE, Petros Karadimas, Member, IEEE, Dhouha Kbaier Ben Ismail,
Haider Al-Khateeb, Ali Dehghantanha, Senior Member, IEEE,
and Kim-Kwang Raymond Choo , Senior Member, IEEE
Abstract—The physical attributes of the dynamic1
vehicle-to-vehicle propagation channel can be utilized for2
the generation of highly random and symmetric cryptographic3
keys. However, in a physical-layer key agreement scheme,4
nonreciprocity due to inherent channel noise and hardware5
impairments can propagate bit disagreements. This has to6
be addressed prior to the symmetric key generation which is7
inherently important in Social Internet of Things networks,8
including in adversarial settings (e.g., battlefields). In this paper,9
we parametrically incorporate temporal variability attributes,10
such as 3-D scattering and scatterers’ mobility. Accordingly,11
this is the first work to incorporate such features into the key12
generation process by combining nonreciprocity compensation13
with turbo codes (TCs). Preliminary results indicate a significant14
improvement when using TCs in bit mismatch rate and key15
generation rate in comparison to sample indexing techniques.16
Index Terms—Internet of Battlefield Things, Internet of17
Military Things, key generation rate (KGR), secret bit extraction,18
Social Internet of Things (SIoT) networks, turbo codes (TCs).19
I. INTRODUCTION20
CONVENTIONAL cryptographic solutions in wireless21 communications generate shared secrets using precompu-22
tational techniques or asymmetric cryptographic protocols [1].23
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However, the challenges of generating such secret keys are 24
compounded due to other competing requirements such as 25
energy efficiency, and the need to minimize computational 26
complexity and processing-communication overhead, partic- 27
ularly in autonomous communication of Internet of Things 28
(IoT) nodes and Social IoT (SIoT) networks [2]. In recent 29
literature, there have been efforts to extend data sharing for 30
different types of traffic in vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) commu- 31
nications, in both civilian and military context (e.g., Internet 32
of Military Things and Internet of Battlefield Things) [3]. 33
Human social network infrastructures and subscription ser- 34
vices are now available to sensors, where the establishment 35
and exploitation of social relationships among them is com- 36
pletely transparent to the users or their owners [4], [5]. This 37
necessitates the redesign of existing data networks, based on 38
a new network paradigm to maximize security and reliability. 39
However, these are challenging issues due to vehicle mobil- 40
ity in vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs). Unsurprisingly, 41
smart vehicles are the objects of SIoT interactions building 42
relationships to enhance the driving knowledge and provide a 43
wider range of the services to the drivers. 44
Existing cryptographic solutions are designed independently 45
to the physical properties of the network in which they are 46
applied. This has initiated research activities in the area of 47
fast and efficient key generation algorithms based on physical 48
layer characteristics, such as those based on broad received 49
signal strength (RSS) and frequency selectivity [6]–[8]. In 50
these approaches, the wireless channel acts as a medium to 51
increase key generation rate (KGR), cryptanalysis resilience, 52
and quality of keys generated between end points due to 53
the inherent stochastic nature of wireless propagation chan- 54
nels [9]. In addition, the ability to generate cryptographic keys 55
using these approaches removes the reliance on higher-layer 56
encryption protocols. These “channel-based key” extraction 57
approaches seek to exploit the physical properties of wireless 58
channels, such as reciprocity and temporal/spatial variabil- 59
ity, in an attempt to provide the necessary randomness for 60
symmetric key generation [8], [10]. 61
In a typical VANET environment, the wireless links between 62
nodes and co-existent adversaries experience uncorrelated 63
channel attributes. Therefore, these channels can offer a cer- 64
tain degree of confidentiality during the key generation process 65
2327-4662 c© 2017 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission.
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between parties. Thus, this reduces computational complex-66
ity and eases key management. Secret key information is67
usually generated from one or more channel characteristics68
as part of the signal quantization phase. However, the pro-69
cess to determine appropriate channel metrics to characterize70
a unique wireless channel still remains a challenging and71
complex domain of scientific inquiry [11], [12]. A tradeoff72
also exists between quantization performance and selection73
of thresholds with a direct impact (positive or negative) to74
the KGR. The unification of the shared secret key must75
also adhere to error correction principles and valid processes76
around privacy enhancement techniques in order to minimize77
information leakage during message exchanges. This process78
assures symmetric operation between peers and confidentiality79
by minimizing information exchange during the process of cor-80
recting bit mismatch between transceivers. This is especially81
important in SIoT networks, due to the autonomous nature of82
the nodes exchanging private information.83
This paper is the first attempt in the literature to incorpo-84
rate all essential V2V communication characteristics, such as85
3-D multipath propagation and surrounding scatterers’ mobil-86
ity (i.e., other vehicles), in the key generation process. Our key87
generation technique can be used to establish secure commu-88
nication channels within ad hoc social vehicular networks. We89
employ the comprehensive parametric stochastic V2V channel90
model presented in [13] to synthetically generate the receiver’s91
channel response (Bob’s channel), where the transmitter’s92
response arises after applying the nonreciprocity compensation93
technique presented in [14]. After the necessary thresholding is94
used to allocate bits according to designated signal levels, we95
apply turbo coding (TC) techniques for information reconcilia-96
tion. At the time of this research, this is the first application of97
TC techniques in such a setting (V2V channels with parametric98
3-D multipath propagation and scatterers’ mobility). We report99
significant improvement in certain key performance indica-100
tors, in comparison to existing standard indexing technique101
described in [15]. To ensure a fair comparison, the particular102
indexing technique was again applied in conjunction with the103
nonreciprocity compensation technique in [14]. More specifi-104
cally, the KGR and bit mismatch rate (BMR) are significantly105
improved when combining both nonreciprocity compensation106
and TCs in this paper.107
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section II108
reviews existing works in secret key extraction focusing on109
error reconciliation techniques. In Section III, we briefly110
present the performance metrics employed in similar works.111
In Section IV, we present the adopted key generation process112
by applying TCs and nonreciprocity compensation in V2V113
communication channels incorporating 3-D multipath propa-114
gation and scatterers’ mobility. A comparative summary is also115
presented. Finally, Section V concludes this paper.116
II. RELATED WORKS117
In VANETs (see Fig. 1), nodes are distributed and self-118
organized with the majority of wireless communication carried119
out by on-board units integrated with additional services and120
processes running [16]. High mobility of these nodes and121
Fig. 1. Vehicular networking architecture.
propagation mechanisms of vehicular channels render these 122
environments susceptible to faster fading, multipath delay, path 123
loss, and increased Doppler frequency shift. These unique 124
temporal and spatial properties can generate significant ran- 125
domness in secret-bit extraction and key distribution because 126
channel responses are reciprocal between two end points. Also, 127
the prediction of randomness in these dynamic environments 128
is more difficult than static ones due to the high entropy bits 129
extracted in shorter time [17]. Different approaches have been 130
published in secure key extraction protocols with different 131
strengths and limitations with regards to entropy, secret bit 132
extraction rate, KGR, number of nodes and threat models. 133
For an exhaustive comparison of these protocols, readers are 134
encouraged to see work in [18]. 135
A. Challenges in Secret Key Generation 136
The secret key information is usually generated from one 137
or more channel characteristics as part of the signal quanti- 138
zation phase, including fluctuations of signal amplitudes and 139
channel phase [12], [19], [20]. A tradeoff exists between quan- 140
tization performance and selection of thresholds with a direct 141
impact (positive or negative) to the KGR, entropy, and BMR. 142
These metrics can be affected by the time difference between 143
channel estimates at Alice and Bob, channel decorrelation in 144
time (channel coherence time), inherent communication noise 145
and hardware impairments [21]. The unification of the shared 146
secret key must also adhere to error correction principles 147
and valid processes around privacy enhancement techniques 148
in order to minimize information leakage during message 149
exchanges. Specifically in V2V communications very high 150
temporal variability takes place due to mobility of transmitter, 151
receiver, and surrounding scatterers [13], [22], [23]. Though 152
disadvantageous for communication purposes, such temporal 153
variability can be readily exploited in the key generation pro- 154
cess. Signal strength variations due to dynamically changing 155
environments have been leveraged in secret key extraction 156
in [24] and [25]. Authors have demonstrated certain degree 157
of entropy in the key generation and exchange process under 158
the assumption that an adversary has unbounded capacity to 159
estimate RSS values of the packets transmitted. Ali et al. [26] 160
introduced a filtering technique promised to maintain entropy 161
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and improve signal correlation between communication parties162
by restricting bit generation only for the period of time that163
high motion-related fluctuation is present. Movement charac-164
teristics and their influence in RSS variation have also been165
exploited for key generation in [21] and [27]. The correla-166
tion between the probing rate and KGR was observed in [28].167
Authors introduced an adaptive probing scheme that dynam-168
ically changes the probing rate subject to channel-related169
parameters.170
B. Secure Key Generation Strategies171
Shehadeh et al. [29] positively correlated entropy of secret172
bits as a function of mobility with high secret-bit extraction173
rate. A single channel observation can lead to lower average174
number of secret bits generated whereas Wilson et al. [12]175
modeled the upper bound of the average secret key extrac-176
tion rate as a function of the signal bandwidth. Most of the177
approaches rely on the assumptions that Eve cannot jam the178
communication channel and is not close to either Alice or Bob.179
Additional challenges have been recorded when RSS is used180
as a metric to be quantized [14]. Typical thresholds selected181
usually do not account for points in between them thus reduc-182
ing the overall key quality or information available for the183
key generation process. In addition, RSS is usually extracted184
by a single frequency resulting in low bit generation rates.185
On the other hand, channel-phased quantization presents sev-186
eral benefits as higher level of secrecy can be achieved by187
the uniform distribution of the phases on the channel taps188
and increase KGR by leveraging the whole channel impulse189
response (CIR) [18]. It is also noticed that a higher number190
of secret bits can be extracted that removes the need to esti-191
mate RSS over a certain time window. RSS-based approaches192
though do not require significant hardware modifications with193
better overall performance in respect to synchronization errors.194
The CIR can be described as follows [9]:195
h(t) =
L−1∑
i=0
hlδ(t − tl) (1)196
where δ(.) is the impulse delta function, L is the number of197
channel paths, hl is the lth path complex gain, and tl is the198
delay of the signal on the lth path in the multipath chan-199
nel. The multipath fading channel properties in frequency200
domain have also been investigated in the literature as an201
alternative way to achieve high entropy and KGR. Channel202
state information extracted from OFDM subcarriers has been203
also introduced in an attempt to reduce random noise and204
improve overall KGR [14]. Multiple thresholds are also used205
to further quantize these average values of channel response206
to generate a binary sequence. That bit sequence is then207
normalized through error reconciliation techniques to assure208
symmetric and identical bits within the key space. Although209
this approach is generic, applies more on static nodes and does210
not depend on mobility aspects making it suitable for wireless211
sensor networks. A further challenge would be the violation of212
orthogonality due to Doppler effect inherent in VANETs [30].213
Liu et al. [14] argued that channel state information214
extracted within the coherence time of the channel could be215
nonreciprocal due to different electrical properties of wire- 216
less devices including antenna systems and RF front circuitry. 217
This unavoidably prevents the extraction of symmetric crypto- 218
graphic keys with low-BMR. However, the channel response 219
in different subcarriers should be different due to diversified 220
frequencies. The location and time in which channel response 221
measurements were taken for a specific subcarrier also differ 222
which can be argued as a factor increasing key random- 223
ness. Wilhelm et al. [31] added that channel information at 224
the receiver can be modeled as a location-dependent variable 225
with enough information entropy to be utilized in key gen- 226
eration. However, if channel response is measured in a short 227
period of time highly correlated estimates are generated in 228
both transmitters. A channel gain complement (CGC) algo- 229
rithm was introduced in an attempt to reduce the disparity of 230
channel responses [14]. The nonreciprocity components were 231
identified with the use of probe packets for each subcarrier. 232
Authors have recorded high BMR when channel state informa- 233
tion is quantized in the time domain compared to the frequency 234
domain. 235
The randomness of signal envelope to share the secret key 236
between two parties has also been examined where deep fades 237
have been used to extract correlated bit strings based on a theo- 238
retical analysis and simulation results only [21], [32]. Multiple 239
antenna diversity has also been investigated for secret key 240
extraction with limitations in the KGR [33]. Mathur et al. [21] 241
have argued that the signal envelope can provide (to a pair 242
of transceivers) enough entropy required to extract a crypto- 243
graphic key for data exchange without the necessity to experi- 244
ence identical signal envelops between transceivers. Although 245
focus on deep fades can partially overcome interference prob- 246
lems, however, the quality of the symmetric key and the KGR 247
is low. Authors also limit their discussion on the secure ways 248
that key verification information can be exchanged. They also 249
hold assumptions that the size of the bit streams between the 250
two transceivers are the same although calculated by different 251
random sources. Also, work in [32] proved to be computa- 252
tionally expensive when it comes to key recovery phase that 253
render the algorithm difficult to be implemented in V2V com- 254
munications. Their fuzzy information reconciliation algorithm 255
seems to remove these constraints but the outcome is reduced 256
entropy in the overall quality of the key produced. Information 257
reconciliation is the process of correcting mismatch bits of the 258
quantization phase by publicly exchanging information to be 259
used for corrective actions [34]. 260
Quantization and thresholding are the most important pro- 261
cesses in the key establishment process as they provide initial 262
information based on channel characteristics. Also, these pro- 263
cesses directly affect the bit mismatch probability due to 264
nonfully reciprocal but highly correlated channel responses of 265
Alice and Bob as a result of inherent communication noise and 266
transceivers hardware impairments. The number of thresholds 267
selected during quantization also presents a tradeoff between 268
KGR and random noise. Additional issues with fixed and 269
multiple thresholds were also reported such as susceptibil- 270
ity to active attacks and discard of sampled values between 271
thresholds, respectively [9]. Protection against active attacks 272
has been partially addressed in [6] with an adaptive secret 273
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bit generation scheme. In this approach, sampled values were274
divided into blocks and each block has been independently275
quantized using its own thresholds based on its average and276
standard deviation. Although this paper seem to improve over-277
all key generation does not account for imperfect channel278
reciprocity.279
Specifically in V2V communications very high temporal280
variability takes place due to the mobility of transmitter,281
receiver and surrounding scatterers. Though disadvantageous282
for communication purposes, such temporal variability can be283
readily exploited in the key generation process. Two differ-284
ent techniques have been introduced in [35], namely least285
square thresholding and neural network-based error recon-286
ciliation. Authors recorded an improvement in the detection287
of fades with smaller depth in environments with no deep288
fades (e.g., line-of-sight situations). The latter technique uses289
two similar bit strings to generate keys of arbitrary length290
known to both Alice and Bob. The security of this sys-291
tem is based on the assumption that Eve cannot adequately292
reverse the training process of the neural network. A low-293
cost approach with regards to channel sampling effort was294
introduced in [28]. The authors modeled mathematically an295
adaptive channel probing approach based on Lempel–Zin and296
proportional-integral-derivative controller. Adaptation of the297
probing rate showed improvements in both KGR and efficiency298
of the probing process.299
C. Privacy Amplification300
The last step in the key generation process assumes that301
the information extraction about the shared key used should302
be computationally expensive to adversaries (privacy ampli-303
fication). Most existing approaches focus on different threat304
models and assumptions around level of access to the chan-305
nel. “Trapdoor” functions are used as a mean to assure certain306
level of authentication and integrity in this process [36]. These307
functions are also used as a mean to deduce the size of the308
final key and amplify any errors if hashing a reasonable copy309
of the key is attempted, to a degree that even an exhaustive310
search of the key space would be infeasible. This process is311
also used to account for any information exposed during error312
reconciliation phase and ensure that eavesdroppers do not gain313
significant advantage to the point where they are able to recon-314
struct a significant part of the key. In the next, we present an315
overview of the most important error correction codes that can316
be potentially used in the information reconciliation stage.317
D. Error Correction Codes318
Error reconciliation is the next step in the secret key gen-319
eration process to correct miss-matched information due to320
imperfect reciprocity and random noise in the channel. Several321
error reconciliation algorithms have been introduced with dif-322
ferent tradeoffs between communication and computational323
complexity and throughput error correction capabilities (e.g.,324
Cascade and Winnow). The Cascade error reconciliation pro-325
tocol assumes that two legitimate parties agree on a random326
permutation over a public channel [37]. This random permuta-327
tion takes place over their shifted keys in an attempt to evenly328
distribute errors. Their shifted keys are then divided in blocks 329
where each block does not present more than one error based 330
on the error rate calculated [38]. 331
Linear error correction codes known as Hamming codes 332
have been also introduced in [39]. In order for a sender to 333
transmit a message with a Hamming code the dot product 334
of a generator matrix and the message must be calculated 335
(code word). The code word is then transmitted at the receiver 336
who computes the product of the code word and the parity 337
check matrix (syndrome). If the calculated syndrome at the 338
receiver is a zero vector, the message was received without any 339
errors. In Winnow protocol [40], the operation is much similar 340
with Cascade. The protocol also suggests privacy maintenance 341
throughout the whole reconciliation phase as a mean to protect 342
information exposed during parity and syndrome exchanges. 343
Low density parity codes (LDPCs) are known for the low 344
density of their parity check matrices which linearly increases 345
the complexity of the decoding algorithm as the length of the 346
message increases [41]. In LDPC codes, the minimum distance 347
(as in Hamming codes) and the decoding algorithm used are 348
considered essential parameters to their performance. In their 349
original form LDPC codes have fixed number of 1s in each 350
column k and each row j along with the block n, known as 351
(n, j, k) low density code. The original algorithm developed by 352
Gallager [41] to generate those LDPC matrices was deemed 353
insufficient for large key spaces and limited to work only with 354
regular codes (codes with fixed number of 1s in both columns 355
and rows). LDPC can be more efficient than Cascade as they 356
can become rate adaptive leading to more efficient interactive 357
reconciliation protocols [42], [43]. 358
The invention of TCs [44] was a revival for the channel cod- 359
ing research community. Historical TCs, also sometimes called 360
parallel concatenated convolutional codes, are based on a par- 361
allel concatenation of two recursive systematic convolutional 362
codes separated by an interleaver. They are called “turbo” in 363
reference to the analogy of their decoding principle with the 364
turbo principle of a turbo compressed engine, which reuses 365
the exhaust gas in order to improve efficiency. 366
The turbo decoding principle calls for an iterative algo- 367
rithm involving two component decoders exchanging infor- 368
mation in order to improve the error correction performance 369
with the decoding iterations. This iterative decoding principle 370
was soon applied to other concatenations of codes sepa- 371
rated by interleavers, such as serial concatenated convolutional 372
codes [45], [46], sometimes called serial TCs, or concate- 373
nation of block codes, also named block TCs [47], [48]. 374
The near-capacity performance of TCs and their suitability 375
for practical implementation explain their adoption in various 376
communication standards. Nguyen et al. [49] proposed uti- 377
lizing TCs for reconciliation purposes. Further investigation 378
in [50] shows that TCs are good candidates for reconcilia- 379
tion. The efficacy of TCs with regards to their error correction 380
capabilities in various wireless communication standards is 381
also recorded in [51]. Further work in [23] demonstrates the 382
improved performance of TCs over Reed Solomon and CCs 383
which are the de-facto error correction codes used in 802.11p 384
vehicular networks. However, this paper does not comprehen- 385
sively incorporate physical propagation characteristics such as 386
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3-D scattering and scatterers’ mobility which is addressed in387
this paper.388
III. PERFORMANCE METRICS389
As VANETs are inherently rapidly time-varying due to390
multipath propagation, this paper parametrically models and391
quantifies such temporal variability attributes and incorporates392
them into the key generation process. In addition, violation393
of reciprocity due to hardware impairments or other penalty394
factors will be compensated in the architectural design and395
implementation. The proposed algorithmic process will have396
to compensate for penalty factors influencing the coherence397
region. The necessity for this paper stems from the research398
effort to further reduce BMR while maintaining high KGR399
in practical VANET environments where mobility of the400
nodes and large network scale imposes unique security chal-401
lenges. Three performance indicators, namely entropy, secret402
bit extraction rate, and BMR, are discussed. The later deter-403
mines the rate at which the V2V channel is probed in order404
to secure highly uncorrelated successive samples. We thus405
present in the following the probing rate together with the406
three performance indicators.407
A. Probing Rate408
The probing rate for both Alice and Bob FP = fPA = fPB409
is considered the same for the purpose of channel estimates410
collection. To achieve uncorrelated successive channel probes,411
thus achieving highest entropy, successive probes have to be412
taken in different coherence regions. Thus, we must define413
FP ≤ vmax, where vmax is the maximum Doppler frequency414
shift [13]. Considering single bounce of multipath power onto415
mobile scatterers (e.g., other vehicles), it is defined as [13]416
vmax = fc
c
(uT max + uR max + 2uS max) (2)417
where fc is the carrier frequency, c the speed of light in free418
space, and uT max, uR max, and uS max the maximum velocities419
of transmitter, receiver, and mobile scatterers, respectively. In420
order to maximize the bit extraction rate, we should investigate421
the feasibility of defining FP as equal to vmax.422
B. Entropy Measures423
The de-facto metric which quantifies the uncertainty is the424
entropy of the generated bit string. The higher the entropy425
the limited the ability to deduce a secret key established by426
Eve due to larger uncertainty introduced. Entropy per bit i is427
defined as [9]428
Hi = −p0 log2 p0 − (1 − p0) log2(1 − p0) (3)429
where p0 the probability of having zero and 1 − p0 = p1430
the probability of having one. Ideally, we should have p0 =431
p1 = 0.5. For independent bit sequences, the total entropy is432
Htotal = ∑Ni=1 Hi, where N is the total number of bits in a433
sequence [52]. In an ideal case, Htotal = N bits.434
C. Secret Bit Extraction Rate 435
The rate is measured in terms of the final secret-bits 436
extracted after error reconciliation and privacy amplification. 437
In practice, the secret bit extraction rate depends on the prob- 438
ing rate from Alice and Bob and the number of secret bits per 439
probing. The amount of secret bits extracted in a time vary- 440
ing channel is influenced by the thresholding. Considering 0s 441
and 1s to be generated with equal probabilities (after proper 442
thresholding) the secret bit extraction rate will be Rk [15] 443
Rk = 2fPp(A = 1, B = 1) (4) 444
where p(A = 1, B = 1) is the joint probability of having 1 445
simultaneously at Alice’s and Bob’s bit strings. However, in 446
this paper we consider KGR as the number of symmetric keys 447
produced per unit time. 448
D. Bit Mismatch Rate 449
Usually BMR will be measured as a ratio of the number 450
of bits that do not match between Alice and Bob to the num- 451
ber of bits extracted at the thresholding stage often used as 452
a performance criterion for the quantization process [9]. The 453
BMR is measured immediately after the thresholding stage 454
because a single mismatch in the bitstring can render the secret 455
key unusable. BMR differs from the bit error rate (BER) in 456
communication theory, which represents the number of bits 457
received in error. The two reasons for bit mismatch are the 458
unavoidable inherent noise in any wireless communication link 459
and the violation of reciprocity due to hardware impairments. 460
As violation of nonreciprocity is compensated we are left with 461
the inherent noise as a unique problem. This noise will add 462
uncertainty to the transmitted bit strings given the received 463
bit strings. Ideally, both bit strings should have been identical. 464
The bit mismatch probability can be described as follows [15]: 465
PN = 1 − (1 − pe)N (5) 466
where pe will be the probability of a single erroneous bit 467
defined as [32] 468
pe = P(B = 0|A = 1) = P(B = 0, A = 1)P(A = 1) (6) 469
where P(B = 0|A = 1) is the conditional probability of Bob’s 470
bit being 0 when Alice’s is 1. 471
IV. NONRECIPROCITY COMPENSATION AND 472
TC RECONCILIATION IN VANET 473
The key generation process presented in Fig. 2 considers 474
for error reconciliation the method presented in [15] and for 475
a first time TCs in a V2V environment. However, the input 476
data in our case are generated synthetically in order to comply 477
with V2V propagation settings. 478
A. V2V Channel Model 479
The synthetic simulated Bob’s channel response is generated 480
by employing the Monte Carlo simulation method [53]. For 481
the V2V setting the theoretical channel model that needs to 482
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Fig. 2. Algorithmic process for combined TC and NR compensation.
be simulated has been described in detail in [13]. Thus Bob’s483
response in time domain is written as484
GB(t) =
L∑
l=1
|αl|exp( jφl)exp(j2πult). (7)485
The Doppler frequency ul is determined by486
ul = vT,l + uS,l + uR,l (8)487
where uT,l, uS,l, and uR,l are the contributions due to Tx mobil-488
ity, scatterers’ mobility, and Rx mobility, respectively. The489
Doppler shift uT(R),l results from the departure (arrival) of the490
lth multipath component from the mobile Tx (to the mobile491
Rx). It is defined as [13]492
uT(R),l = uT(R) max cos βT(R),l cos αT(R),l (9)493
where uT(R) max = vT(R)/λ, λ is the carrier wavelength, uT(R) is494
the Tx (Rx) velocity, αT(R),l is the azimuth angle of departure495
(AOD) [angle of arrival (AOA)], and βT(R),l is the elevation496
AOD (AOA) with respect to the Tx (Rx) motion. αT(R),l counts497
from the value −π in the negative y-axis returning to the same498
point in the clockwise direction and βT(R),l is zero on the X–Y499
plane, π/2 on the positive z-axis and −π/2 on the negative500
z-axis. Considering interaction of the lth multipath compo-501
nent with a single mobile scatterer, the Doppler shift vS,l will502
be [13]503
uS,l = (vS,l/λ)(cos αl,l + cos α2,l) (10)504
where vS,l is the scatterer’s velocity, αl,l the AOA, and α2,l505
the AOD with respect to scatterer’s motion.506
The target is to appropriately model each factor affecting507
the V2V channel response, namely {|αl|}, {ul}, and {φl}. In508
this paper we consider a normalized (power equal to unity)509
Rayleigh V2V channel with partially uniform 3-D scattering510
at both Alice’s and Bob’s sides with a Weibull distribution511
of the mobile scatterers’ velocity. Rather than just a scenario512
for demonstration, the partially 3-D uniform scattering can513
be further generalized to represent any multipath propagation514
scenario [54] whereas the Weibull distribution for the multi-515
path power contributed by mobile scatterers has been proved516
a suitable modeling approach [55]. Thus the scatterers veloc-517
ity, which in fact models the power contributed by mobile518
scatterers, is defined as519
pus = wub−1S exp
(
−wubS
/
b
)
(11)520
where b ≤ 1 is the shape parameter and w the scale param- 521
eter. The amplitudes |αl| are constant and phases φi are 522
uniformly distributed in [−π, π], i.e., |αl| = √2/L and 523
φl ∼ U[−π, π ] [53]. Each Doppler contribution of (7) has 524
the following parameters need to be modeled: azimuth AOD, 525
AOA αT(R),l ∼ U[AT(R) min, AT(R) max] elevation AOD (AOA) 526
βT(R),l ∼ U[BT(R) min, BT(R) max], AOA to mobile scatterer 527
α1,l ∼ U[−π, π ], AOD to mobile scatterer α2,l ∼ U[−π, π ], 528
and power contributed by mobile scatterers uS ∼ pus(uS). The 529
symbolism U[., .] stands for the uniform distribution in the 530
designated interval. This scenario can approximate an urban 531
environment with other mobile vehicles and heavy scattering. 532
In order to simulate a purely diffuse Rayleigh environ- 533
ment we need at least seven sum of sinusoids such as those 534
seen in (7) [56]. For simulation purposes, we define L = 20. 535
The sampling/probing rate Fp = 1/Tc min where Tc min = 536
1/vmax = (c/fc)/(uT max + uR max + 2uS max) is the minimum 537
coherence in time and uT max, uR max, and uS max are the max- 538
imum Doppler shifts due to mobile transmitter, receiver, and 539
scatterers, respectively. In this way, we secure that the channel 540
is mostly probed in different coherence regions, thus succes- 541
sive bits will be independent, resulting keys with maximum 542
entropy. Considering the maximum velocity of transmitter, 543
receiver, and scatters to be 30 m/s, frequency of operation 544
fc = 6 GHz, the probing rate is calculated as Fp = 2400 sam- 545
ples per second. We can further reduce FP, as 1/Tc min is in 546
fact its upper bound, however doing so, will reduce the KGR, 547
resulting marginal improvement in the key entropy. The latter 548
is just our perception and further research is required; how- 549
ever, it goes beyond the scope of this article, which focuses on 550
the applicability of TCs at the information reconciliation stage 551
and potential performance improvement. A possible solution 552
might be to adapt FP = 1/Tc min to fit in changes of the 553
coherence region due to variations in the propagation condi- 554
tions (e.g., more intense scatterers’ mobility, more directional 555
propagation, etc.). 556
B. Algorithmic Process 557
Alice’s channel response would normally arise by sim- 558
ilar channel probing rate in time instances such that hers 559
and Bob’s responses are taken within the same coherence 560
region. However, to further improve performance, Alice’s 561
response GA(t) will arise after applying the nonreciprocity 562
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compensation model presented in [14]. Thus considering563
M estimates within the same coherence region between564
Alice and Bob, their channel responses are related as [14]565
GA(t) − GB(t) ∼ N
(
0, σ 2
)
. (12)566
The variance is estimated by the discrepancy of567
Alice’s and Bob’s estimates as follows:568
σ 2 = 1
M
M∑
i=1
(
GA,i(t) − GB,i(t) − μt
)2 (13)569
where570
μt = 1M
M∑
i=1
(GA,i(t) − GB,i(t)). (14)571
This method was presented in [15] where Alice and Bob572
determine samples from channel estimates above and below573
an upper and lower threshold discarding those in between,574
i.e., lossy thresholding. We use this approach to compare it575
against our TC correction process presented in Fig. 2. Those576
estimates are samples in a form of an excursion. The quantiza-577
tion process creates segments of those samples (also referred578
as excursions) of successive bit values of 1s and 0s. Each of579
those segments are created whenever a channel probe returns a580
reading that does not fall inside the thresholds. Alice selects a581
random set of these segments and sends to Bob the index of the582
channel estimate lying in the center of the segment defined as583
icenter = [(istart + iend)/2] as a list La. The number of chan-584
nel estimates are modeled in the simulation and the total size585
for each segment has been setup to m = 5 successive esti-586
mates that fall outside the thresholds (acceptable estimates).587
However, m is a configurable parameter of the algorithm that588
combined with the quantization process affects the tradeoff589
between KGR and bit miss-match probability. Indeed a larger590
value of m reduces the number of secret bits that can be gener-591
ated per second. Following implementation and testing in [15],592
we define m = 5. For each index from Alice, Bob checks his593
segments and verifies his samples centered around that index594
above or below the thresholds q−, q+ matched with Alice and595
generates a new list of those indices Lb ≤ La. Bob sends Lb596
over to Alice. Both Alice and Bob quantize their channel esti-597
mates at each index of Lb in order to generate the bit-string.598
Thus, this method simultaneously accomplishes thresholding599
and information reconciliation.600
C. Results and Discussion601
Part of the algorithmic operation is to develop an optimiza-602
tion subroutine to adaptively change the threshold as a function603
of the temporal variability of the channel. The optimization604
routine will consider several attributes such as multiclus-605
tered 3-D scattering, specular-reflected multipath components,606
and multiple bounces on mobile objects in dense propaga-607
tion environments. Threshold selection has to be adopted608
dynamically to the temporal variations induced by the afore-609
mentioned effects. The thresholds should be refreshed after610
a specific amount of time over which the stationarity region611
has been crossed. We anticipate the refresh to take place612
every ten coherence regions due to the inherent nonstation- 613
arity of the V2V channel [13]. An alternative way to refresh 614
the thresholding process could be to consider a Doppler spec- 615
trum correlation criterion. More specifically, considering the 616
normalized Doppler spectrum as a probability distribution of 617
Doppler frequencies, the Doppler correlation coefficient will 618
be defined as 619
ρ(X, Y) = cov(X, Y)
σXσY
(15) 620
where cov(X, Y) is the covariance of the X, Y normalized 621
Doppler spectra and σX, σY are the standard deviations of X, 622
Y, respectively. When the correlation coefficient falls below 623
a specified threshold, e.g., the quantization and threshold- 624
ing process will be refreshed. The first phase of the routine 625
developed is the construction of the Synthetic data which 626
will be generated via Monte Carlo simulation taking into 627
account the number of multiple components, the sampling rate 628
and total number of samples. In the next stage the probed 629
received envelopes are generated considering an appropriately 630
defined probing rate in order to maximize the entropy in 631
the subsequent quantization step. From the received data, the 632
transmitted data are modeled by considering nonreciprocity 633
compensation. At this stage a lossy quantization process is 634
preferred due to its computational simplicity. The target is to 635
end up with a maximum secret bit extraction rate and entropy. 636
For that purpose, in the following step several runs should take 637
place considering the thresholds multiple pairs. A feasibility 638
study of both lossless and lossy quantization processes and 639
their applicability in V-V scenarios is an area for further inves- 640
tigation. We consider the transmission scenario between Alice 641
and Bob. The transmitter’s samples are modeled by adopting 642
a CGC technique which compensates channel nonreciprocity. 643
This is done by adding a zero mean Gaussian variability to the 644
receivers samples. Thus, the input information sequence in the 645
TC represents the generated key for Bob, while the output of 646
the AWGN channel after turbo encoding designates the gen- 647
erated key for Alice. Then, turbo decoding is performed and 648
the performance of the reconciliation method can be evaluated 649
by measuring the BER and the KGR. 650
Bob’s generated sequence after quantization is fed to the 651
input of a TC. During this process a single threshold is adopted 652
as a lossless quantization scheme with the potential to substan- 653
tially increase the KGR [32]. The threshold adopted in this 654
paper is static and equal to 1. However, an adaptive quan- 655
tization process related to the channel temporal variability 656
that updates the threshold at each stage is currently investi- 657
gated. Turbo decoding is then performed in order to generate 658
a symmetric output, i.e., symmetric keys for Alice and Bob. 659
Increasing the number of decoding iterations in TCs reduces 660
the BER, thus, improving the bit miss-match rate between 661
Alice and Bob. Furthermore, it would result to an increased 662
KGR at the expense of added computational complexity as 663
part of the turbo decoding process. In our algorithm, TCs 664
are simulated with a single iteration. Performance of the rec- 665
onciliation method can be evaluated by measuring the BMR 666
and to the BER in our case. The comparison is made against 667
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TABLE I
TC SIMULATION RESULTS IN SECRET KEY GENERATION
TABLE II
COMPARISON OF BMR WITH EXISTING RSS-BASED APPROACHES
the sample indexing technique already applied in our algo-668
rithm as discussed in Section IV-B. We measure the efficiency669
and efficacy of our algorithm against widely adopted metrics,670
namely entropy, bit miss-match rate, probing rate, and KGR.671
We calculated BMR for the indexing method by considering672
the discarded indexes after Alice’s and Bob’s channel prob-673
ing. In Table I we compute the KGR for different key lengths.674
Compared to the samples’ indexing method in [9], there was675
a significant improvement on both BMR and KGR. The simu-676
lated BER to generate a symmetric shared key between Alice677
and Bob after error reconciliation is estimated to only 0.0752678
using TCs. Furthermore, the BMR with single thresholding679
is only 0.02 whereas the estimated BMR with the indexing680
technique is around 0.22 in both cases of static and mobile681
scatterers. The KGR was also reported high considering dif-682
ferent key lengths requested. For instance, the secret key rate to683
generate the 128-bit symmetric key is 35 good keys per minute684
with TCs while it varies from 3 to 7 symmetric keys per minute685
with the indexing technique. As shown in Table I, simulations686
proved similar improvements for different key lengths as part687
of the error reconciliation process. Satisfactory entropy values688
were obtained throughout all rounds of simulation during the689
key extraction process ranging from 0.85 to 0.97 bits per sam-690
ple. Note that the BMR with the indexing technique is nearly691
the same for different key lengths which is coherent with the692
uniform method used by the authors. In Table II, we present a693
comparison between the BMR achieved in our approach with694
existing RSS-based approaches published in the literature.695
V. CONCLUSION696
We successfully combined nonreciprocity compensation and697
TCs for information reconciliation as the most important fea-698
tures in V2V communication including 3-D scattering and699
scatterers’ mobility. Findings from our evaluations indicated700
significant improvements were achieved in KGR with reduced701
BMR when TCs are employed against an existing index-702
ing method. Our proposed technique can be used to secure703
communications between vehicular nodes in an ad hoc SIoT704
network, and this has applications in both civilian and adver- 705
sarial/military context (e.g., Internet of Military Things and 706
Internet of Battlefield Things). 707
Future studies include the investigation of TCs for error con- 708
ciliation purposes especially in the context of SIoT networks. 709
For example, we will focus on several parameters that affect 710
performance of TCs such as component decoding algorithms, 711
number of decoding iterations, generator polynomials, con- 712
straint lengths of the component encoders and the interleaver 713
type. Increasing the number of iterations in the TC can sig- 714
nificantly improve the BER, thus generating more symmetric 715
keys. Furthermore, we are working toward the single thresh- 716
olding process by creating a dynamic threshold that is updated 717
according to the receiver’s samples. 718
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